1902 – The Second Expedition
The Mullah continued spreading his revolt throughout Somalia
and throughout May to September
1902 the Dervish forces increased again to somewhere between 12,000 and 15,000
with at least 600 rifles. The
British, similarly, had more forces available following the end of the Boer War.
Swayne now had a force of 2,400 men.
Now promoted to Commissioner, he was to be superseded by Brigadier
William Manning and now decided to launch a further expedition against the
Mullah before Manning arrived.
By September he had assembled a column comprising five
companies of the Second Battalion, King’s African Rifles (KAR), a Sikh unit from
Aden, the Somali Levy (now 1,500 strong), two 7pdr guns, Maxims, 2,000 camels
carrying water and 2,000 camels for rations.
He set off down the Nogal valley before crossing a hundred miles of the
waterless southern Haud to the Mudug Oasis.
The Mullah was reported to be in the oasis with several thousand of his
followers including about 1,200 riflemen.
The column was preceded by mounted scouts and patrols.
The advance was made through 70 miles of dense thorn scrub in constant
contact with Dervish scouts and outposts.
On 4 October scouts reported that the Mullah’s forces were
about a day’s march ahead. The
column camped on the night of 5 October at Erigo and moved out before dawn on 6
October through dense brush towards their objective.
From positions up in the trees observers from both sides watched each
other’s movements. The Dervish
skilfully laid an ambush within the brush and Swayne’s column was only saved by
a scout’s warning. Without the
warning they would have been engaged in a battle in dense foliage with
visibility often down to a mere 5 yards where few men could see more than half a
dozen of their fellows. In this
close terrain Swayne called a halt and formed open square in typical style with
the baggage animals in the centre.
This was just completed when the Dervishes attacked from three sides.
They appeared at just 20 yards range from their hiding places in the
thick bush. The left side of the
square formed by some recently raised Somali Levy disorganised by the sudden
attack and the confusion caused by the stampeding baggage camels fell back fell
back on the centre and rear companies.
Major GE Phillips commanding them was killed attempting to rally his men.
The Yaos of the KAR held firm on this side of the square as did the half
company of Somalis told off as Headquarters escort and the rest of the square.
The Somalis of the HQ escort mounted a bayonet charge which drove the
Dervishes back from the guns, they lost heavily in the fighting and Swayne’s 4
orderlies were killed. Then the
other companies that had fallen back advanced again to resume their original
positions and the Dervish attach was repulsed.
Captain Angus had been killed whilst serving his guns in the centre of
the front face and despite his death the Somali gunners continued to pour Maxim
and artillery fire into the Dervishes.
The climax of the battle came when a fresh wave of Dervish
spearmen with supporting fire from riflemen charged the remnants of the left
face of the square. Under Swayne’s
personal direction the square reformed and drove the attackers back with
concentrated rifle, Maxim and artillery fire.
The front of the square was also heavily engaged in a fierce hand to hand
melee and eventually the Dervishes gave up the attack.
When they did so, they had suffered around 1,400 casualties amongst the
six Dervish units, the leaders of which were all killed.
In return the column lost 2 officers (Major Phillips RE and Captain Angus
RA), 56 Levies and 43 spearmen killed.
They also lost a Maxim and this led to a Court of Inquiry.
The weapon was not recovered until 1920.
One VC was won by Captain (Acting Lt Col) Alexander S Cobbe of the 1st
(Central African) KAR for conspicuous bravery in manning the guns assisted by a
Somali sergeant.
Swayne, personally led a sweep of 2 companies of the 2/KAR
and 2 companies of Levy to clear the ground beyond the left rear of the square.
The transport camels had all stampeded n this direction and because of
the noise of the firing some thousands of camels with water tins and ammunition
boxes jammed together and rushed into the scrub scattering their loads
everywhere. Almost all of the loads
were recovered. In the evening
Swayne again led a sortie of a company of 2/KAR and two companies of Somalis
into the scrub and returned with 1,800 of the stampeded camels.
On the evening of the 6 October the column buried their dead
and constructed a zeriba.
Scouts were sent out and they located the Dervish scouts 4 miles in
front. The Dervish spent the night
probing through the brush where there were several clashes between the patrols
of both sides. The discipline of
the sentries in the zeriba was steady
and not a shot was fired by them.
The information from prisoners and other sources indicated
that Mudug, the only water, was 40 miles away through 30 miles of dense and
unexplored bush. The column’s
transport was disorganised having lost many camels, some shot in the action and
some lost in the stampede. The
transport camels now proved be a major problem.
The column could not fight through the dense brush with them nor could
they be left behind without a substantial guard force.
Even if it remained in position it would be closely watched by the
Dervish and when it needed to move to get water it would undoubtedly be
attacked. Faced with this dilemma
Swayne decided to retire to a water hole some 6 miles away whilst screening the
movement and diverting attention with aggressive patrols and scouts.
When he arrived at Eyl Garaf Pool on the morning of 7 October he ordered
a strong entrenchment to be constructed while strong patrols were sent out to
contact the Dervish forces.
It soon became clear that the ferocity
of the Dervish soldiers and the casualties were affecting his locally raised
troops badly and morale was falling.
Many of the Somalis had brothers or cousins amongst their enemies.
Many believed that the Mullah could not be killed.
He had escaped on previous occasions when his forces had been scattered
and had always reappeared stronger than before.
Taking all this into consideration and with no prospect of support from
the rear, predicted water difficulties as the pool at Eyl Garaf was already
being used up, Swayne decided to retire with his sick and wounded to Bohotle
taking his Dervish prisoners along with him.
He arrived there on 17 October.
This near defeat taught several lessons including that the
Somali Levies’ morale may not stand in battle.
Also learned was the risk of taking such a large baggage train into dense
bush. The near defeat had another
effect in that more regular troops were to be sent.
Swayne, however, argued that the Levy were more mobile and useful than
the slow and ponderous regulars.
However, Swayne, said that “owing to Mohammedan and tribal feeling, it became
inexpedient to continue to rely on Somalis alone, for they had invariably, with
little preparation and very little cost, succeeded, in both years’ work, in
driving the Mullah with loss out of our Protectorate across the Haud into
Italian territory, whence he did not return until 9 months after our return to
Bohotle.”
The Mullah was reported as having withdrawn, once again, into
Italian territory at Galadi Wells. The Second Expedition was closed.
The expedition had recovered sufficient livestock to replace all the
losses suffered by the loyal tribes and have 1,600 camels left over for baggage
and transport. The Mullah had
suffered heavily with at least 2,600 casualties, a considerable number of
prisoners as well as 40,000 camels,
200 horses and huge numbers of sheep.